

Donald “Larry” Sampler

“Leadership is the special ingredient that makes teams work. With good leadership, the achievements of any given team can sustainably far exceed the sum of the individual contributions. Without leadership, success will be frustratingly episodic and short-lived. Good leadership inspires the team as well as peers in the communities-of-interest and -practice to a common goal: Poor leadership frustrates those same audiences and efforts.”

Larry Sampler, in a USAID leadership Seminar, Aug 2015

Objective: To apply the full range of knowledge, skills, and abilities developed from my early days as a member of the US Army Special Forces, my work for international non-governmental organizations, private sector companies, and the US government to organizations working to improve the world. To lead and mentor young professionals as they grow into the next generation of young professionals. To continue to grow my own knowledge skills and abilities through networking with peers and colleagues to amplify voices for thoughtful solutions to today’s problems, while capturing and sharing empirical data regarding both successes and failures.

Expectations: My next position will be a senior appointment that requires me to employ the variety of bureaucratic, leadership, and management skills and lessons that I have learned over my career, in support of ideas or institutions in which I believe. I will have the opportunity to manage significant resources in support of clear goals and objectives. I will be challenged to address complex problems in innovative ways, inclusively, with the support of a diverse team of professionals eager to learn, grow, and succeed. I will be expected to engage with other senior leaders and the public and will have a significant role engaging and mentoring the next generation of leaders.

Key qualifications:

Senior Leadership: Since being appointed as Deputy Chief of Staff & Operations for a mission of the Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1997, I have held progressively more senior roles and responsibilities in both public and private organizations. I have generated, defended, and executed budgets ranging from several million dollars to over five billion dollars; I have supervised small, targeted teams with very specific time-limited objectives, and have run organizations consisting of hundreds of employees around the world. I have recruited, hired, promoted, counselled, and fired staff. And – unfortunately – buried staff killed in the line of duty and dealt with the consequences for family and co-workers. I have appeared on international news networks, testified under oath before Congress, met with Presidents and Prime Ministers, and led negotiations between parties-in-conflict ranging from local communities to international forums. Ironically perhaps, some of my most challenging negotiations were within the US government.

Leadership & Management of Change: Much of my leadership and management experience has been in situations of dramatic change, requiring the generation of team visions, policies, procedures, cultures, and leading staff to think differently but collectively about their work. I helped design, build, and grow the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after the peace agreement was signed in that country. I led the international support effort in Afghanistan centered around support for their “Emergency Loya Jirga,” a months-long first-ever endeavour involving thousands of people and millions of dollars. Within the US Government, I was the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Management & Operations responsible for standing-up the “Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs” within the US Agency for International Development (USAID; an agency of the federal government), responsible for plans and budgets involving hundreds of staff and billions of dollars. I later became the Assistant Administrator (the equivalent of a 3-star General Officer), where I used those same plans and budgets as tools to provoke significant changes, first in our office, and then across the agency. I was responsible for the fiducial accountability, facilities, and property at our headquarters in Washington, as well as at two US Embassies in conflict zones.

Administrative & institutional efficiency: As Vice President at Creative Associates International, Inc. (a USAID implementing partner) I assumed responsibility for a division that had been unable to meet financial targets for more than a year. Under my leadership, we redesigned the division, carefully examined our financials, reinitiated our new business efforts and – within a year – were profitable. Within two years we

were the most profitable division within the company, and our innovations were being replicated in other divisions. As Assistant Administrator at USAID I designed and implemented (then defended before Congress and the Office of Management and Budget) public-private partnerships ranging from small targeted efforts to large institutional partnerships worth hundreds of millions of dollars that extended the impact and efficiency of our efforts. I was also recognized for innovations in management that I instituted within my office and that were then promulgated throughout the agency. I served in leadership roles as we redesigned our “Human Capital & Talent Management” department for the entire agency, and spear-headed an effort to institutionalize “Staff Care,” which focused on the well-being of our staff deployed around the world.

Current Position: President, One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) in Broomfield, Colorado. OEF is a family-funded operational foundation created in 2007, seeking to promote peace through networked governance in conflicted countries around the world. The foundation has just under one hundred employees, and the 2019 annual budget will be around \$15M. In 2016 I was recruited as the first-ever President of the foundation, with a mandate to create a corporate culture, structures, policies, and procedures that would allow the foundation to grow deliberately but rapidly to become a world-class organization. In my two years leading the foundation, we replaced several toxic or substandard managers; generated new policies and procedures for operational management and safety; revised our HR practices to make diversity a core value of the foundation; revised our accounting systems to incorporate national requirements in Colombia and Somalia, and installed all new accounting software; increased our budget by seventy percent; leveraged our programmatic successes and internal control and management models to secure our first external funding of almost \$20M; and created an empirical monitoring and evaluation system called “Impact, Learning, and Accountability” that is poised to become an industry standard. We also generated a working model for financial assistance in Somalia that requires a 3-way partnership: We provide a third of the capital required, other local donors contribute a third, and the recipient personally raises the final third. This turns out to be highly-successful, because it draws everyone into the partnership: Us, the community, and the recipient (we currently have over \$10M invested in this manner, and have received \$10M in additional funding from the government of Norway). During my tenure we worked hard with our staff, our Board members, and advisors to create a new sense of “we,” and common interests and goals that hadn’t existed before.

Previous Experience:

09/10 – 10/16

Deputy Assistant Administrator (9/10 – 1/14) and Assistant Administrator (01/14 – 10/16) for the Office of Afghanistan & Pakistan Affairs (OAPA) at the US Agency for International Development (USAID), an independent bureau of the US government led by the “Administrator,” reporting directly to the Secretary of State, with an annual budget of around \$23B. The agency is responsible for leading US international development and disaster assistance efforts.

In 2010 I was recruited to become the first “Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Management & Operations” in the newly-created “Office of Afghanistan & Pakistan Affairs” at USAID. The position was the equivalent of a 1-star General Officer in the military. The office had been created to deal with the rapidly-changing situation in Central Asia, and to manage the significant and unexpected financial allocations from the US Congress (measured in the billions of dollars each year). I inherited a team that was hastily-assembled from various other agencies and departments; had no sense of camaraderie or institutional identity; the systems of management and accountability were a haphazard collection of practices brought from other organizations; and morale among the team was abysmal.

As the senior of three deputies, I was the stand-in for the Assistant Administrator when necessary. It was in this role that I first testified before a hostile Congressional Committee to justify our budgets, internal governance, and activities (I eventually testified over six times in as many years. I was also responsible for creating the policies, procedures, and culture that would make our office successful.

Under my leadership, we systematically built (or re-built) the office from the ground up. We instituted professional recruitment, emphasizing the broadest possible recruitment efforts to promote diversity; we initiated a performance evaluation system that complied with federal requirements, but went much further to identify potential leaders among our staff; we created departments within the office that had clear responsibilities and deliverables, so that teams could be developed and given clear, measurable goals and objectives. And we built the reputation of our office – both internally and externally – into something of which people were justifiably proud.

This assignment was the first time I formally used what I called “Task Teams,” where, as the staff identified problems or issues, we assembled self-led teams of staff members who examined the problems, sought, proposed, and then defended their solutions. Staff appreciated the Task Team approach because it empowered them to help solve problems they had identified; or, in some cases, to understand first-hand why the problem couldn’t be solved. It also allowed me to identify peer-leaders among the staff for additional training and grooming to become more formal leaders in the future. This system of bottom-up problem solving was recognized by the agency in 2015 and I was asked to train other leaders in how to use Task Teams. I subsequently received an award from the agency for the innovation.

In 2014, I was competitively selected into the “Senior Executive Service” (SES) of the US government and appointed as Assistant Administrator for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. The SES consists of senior leaders and managers competitively selected by agencies within the US government, then screened by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) before assignment at the highest levels. This position of Assistant Administrator reported directly to the Administrator, who reported to the Secretary of State, who then reported to the President.

My responsibilities as Assistant Administrator included leading staff in the execution of a 3-year planning and budget cycle, then focussing the attention of staff on execution of those plans and budgets. As Assistant Administrator, I was constantly meeting formally and otherwise with our communities-of-practice and -interest. This meant 1-on-1 meetings with Members of Congress, lobbyists, Afghan government officials (including the President), and the leadership of other donor countries. During these meetings I would solicit and receive information that would lead to changes in our plans, ranging from small tweaks to significant re-writes.

Also during this period, the US Congress expressed interest in seeing our US tax dollars used to generate collateral investments from other sources. With this in mind, I directed a strong effort to build partnerships with other donors, diaspora with resources and – in Pakistan particularly – with private sector donors. In the Education sector, for example, there was a tradition in Pakistan of philanthropic interest in schools, but it was haphazard and poorly-managed. We created mechanisms using US funds as the catalyst that brought Pakistani philanthropists together in more effective and efficient ways to support schools with (for example) common standards, that served communities previously not able to provide education to their children.

In 2014 USAID, as an agency, committed to updating and revising our Human Capital & Talent Management (HCTM) programs. Crippled by years of incremental changes to federal systems of human resources management, our inability to fairly, transparently, and effectively manage our staff was singled-out as the greatest drain on morale and retention in the agency. I was one of three senior leaders asked to lead a composite team to poll thousands of staff around the world about necessary changes, engage consultants on what might be possible, and then select and implement the first significant changes to the system in decades.

Concurrently, after seeing the toll that working in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq could have on our staff, I spear-headed an effort to create an agency-wide “staff care

program.” This required significant engagement with Congress, the Department of State, the office of Management & Budget, and others to overcome conservative resistance to even recognizing the problem, before we could allocate resources to the solution. In 2016, as I left the agency, I was recognized for having led this effort which is now in its third year and fully-funded.

08/10 – 09/10

Senior civilian participant, US Central Command Commander Research & Analyses Team, working in Tampa, Florida and Central Asia. I was a by-name request from the CENTCOM Commander, (then) General Jim Mattis, to participate in an intense 2-month analysis of the situation in the Central Asian area of interest.

I was partnered with (then) Brigadier General Frank McKenzie to lead a team of military planners and civilian academicians to explore ways forward in pursuit of peace in Central Asia. Our target audience was the US national security agencies, the US Congress, allied governments, and the US citizenry. Our challenge was that we had less than 60 days to gather and analyse our data and produce a report that would be empirically clear and yet also politically-acceptable. And, perhaps most importantly, the report needed to be impactful, and contribute to a solution.

The two biggest challenges of this effort were insisting on empirically-valid observations and data (we rejected opinions and “current thinking” that could not be validated in some fashion, which caused some offense among policy elite who felt denigrated); and our insistence on new, innovative and potentially-divisive ideas not previously considered (at my insistence, for example, we consulted with Afghan youth organizations for their perspectives on the war and efforts to end it).

06/10 – 07/10

Senior Advisor to the Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) at the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Afghanistan. I was a by-name request to assist UNAMA and MoFA in preparations for and execution of the Kabul Conference in July.

This assignment was very short-notice and predicated on my previous experience planning and executing high-level functions under adverse conditions. The conference held on 20 July at the level of Foreign Minister, was the first such event attempted by the government of Afghanistan. Co-hosted by the United Nations and attended by over 80 Foreign Ministers or their equivalent, there was no room for error. As time drew short for the event with virtually no preparations on the part of the Afghans, I was sought on an emergency basis to come and lead the effort.

The challenges were significant. Afghan government officials initially resented having a foreigner come to run their event. One of my first acts upon arriving was to hold a 6-hour group meeting to air grievances and put them behind us. I set-up a dedicated computer in the office space we were allotted that did nothing but project onto the wall a countdown clock that showed the days, hours, and minutes left until the conference would begin. We united behind a common understanding that we all wanted this event to be successful for the good of the Afghan people, and that we didn't have time to argue.

I also asked the United Nations to convene on my behalf a meeting of all the Ambassadors from donor countries present in Kabul. At this meeting I outlined the significant challenges ahead and, again, the meeting was dominated by the ticking clock projected onto the wall, showing how little time remained. I asked for and received outstanding support for the conference, in the form of financial assistance, key individuals assigned to support our effort, and military logistics officers to help with – for example – coordinating the air space and aircraft parking and security arrangements for over 80 international dignitaries.

After the event, both President Karzai and the Special Representative of the United Nations recognized me for my efforts and noted that my collaborative leadership

style, attention to detail, and diplomatic skills were essential to the event being the success that it was.

09/09 – 01/11

Vice President and Director, Communities in Transition Division of Creative Associates International, Inc., Washington, DC. Creative Associates is a key implementing partner of USAID, currently executing several hundred million dollars in contracts and awards at any given time. The “Communities in Transition” division was intended to focus specifically on helping local communities emerging from conflict to find practical and enduring ways to sustain peace. The division had hired several very expensive advisors but had failed to land contracts to cover their cost: They had lost money for each of the past two years.

After being hired by Creative, I learned that the Board of Directors had intended to eliminate the division due to its poor performance. But because the company wanted to be represented in this substantive space, I was given one year to show that the portfolio was able to produce, or it would be shut down. A first step in rebuilding the division was to take stock of the situation, explain to the staff how precarious things were, and solicit their help in moving forward. We then replaced the expensive consultants with much less expensive writing professionals who dramatically-improved the quality of our proposals to USAID and, within the first year, landed one award worth \$25M, and submitted proposals for three more, totalling over \$150M (we subsequently won one of those awards, split another one with another company, and lost the third). By the time I left Creative the CIT division was the most profitable in the company, and the internal systems and mechanisms I had created were being promulgated across the company.

06/09 – 09/09

Senior Advisor on civil society and development to the Commander, USFOR-A and Commander, International Security Forces in Afghanistan: Was a by-name selection to accompany General Stanley McChrystal as he assumed command in Kabul.

Prior to his deployment, General McChrystal had built a cadre of “trusted advisors” who would help him integrate and lead the fairly complex civil-military establishment he was about to inherit in Kabul. My role was to serve him and his interest with the US Ambassador and his team, as well as the civilian leadership of the other allied embassies in Kabul, and Afghan government officials. This was a uniquely-challenging task, as everyone knew that I was a “temporary” fill-in, so there was less incentive on their part to respect my positions or assertions. It was also sometimes difficult to insist on empirical data, rather than “conventional beliefs.” My tenure on his team was intended to be brief, ending when he had selected an acceptable Political Advisor (“POLAD”) from the senior ranks of the Department of State.

07/07 – 09/09

Principal Deputy Coordinator, US State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS), US Department of State, Washington, DC. S/CRS was an innovative creation, first envisioned by Colin Powell when he served as Secretary of State. The problem he sought to address was our apparent inability to field “whole of government” leadership teams to post-conflict settings so that the US government was able to speak and operate with one voice. The “Coordinator” was an Assistant Secretary-level appointment with broad but unspecified and untested authorities across the federal government: I was recruited to be the Principal Deputy to the Coordinator. Because of the combative nature of relationships between the Department of State and USAID, I was jointly appointed to the position by both organizations.

As the Principal Deputy, I routinely stood-in for the Coordinator at meetings with the Secretary of State and her senior staff. My primary duties, however, were maintaining internal control over our administrative and management functions, program design and execution, and building coalitions between feuding agencies of the US government. Administratively, I was responsible for budget execution, staff

accountability and performance evaluations for our 80+ Foreign Service Officers, Civil Servants, and contractors, and facilities management over three campuses in the DC/Virginia area. We were quite successful in building the kind of interagency quick-response coalitions demanded by the Secretary of State. And Congress was sufficiently impressed after our first two years to dramatically increase our annual budget in 2009 to \$75M. However, entrenched opposition to something this new and potentially threatening to the status quo was sufficient to ensure that the S/CRS capacity was seldom used and, a few years after I left, abandoned.

While I don't consider S/CRS or my time spent there as a failure, I do believe that the greatest take-away I have from that experience is the difficult lessons I learned about the importance of extensive relationship-building and the dangers of assuming alignment of bureaucratic interests. S/CRS was an idea that should have succeeded but, because of ingrained bureaucratic self-interests, did not.

08/05 – 09/09

Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Alexandria, Virginia. IDA is a federally-funded research and development center (FFRDC) whose primary client is the Department of Defense. In the early years of wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, they realized that they needed to broaden their scope to include the confluence of civil and military matters in conflict and post-conflict settings. I was one of their first hires in support of this broader initiative.

I was Involved in various US government research projects, including inter-agency cooperation in complex contingency operations overseas, and integration of multi-national, multi-lateral interventions in post-conflict settings. The “civ-mil perspective” was not always accepted or respected among more traditional practitioners (often retired military officers themselves). It took significant amounts of time and some deliberate strategizing to successfully integrate civ-mil perspectives into the work of the institute. I undertook temporary duty assignments to West-Bank/Gaza and Iraq in support of these US government initiatives, primarily as an observer and consultant on best-practices and lessons (to be) learned.

05/04 – 07/05

Chief of Staff, The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Kabul, Afghanistan. As the Chief of Staff, I was the third-most senior person in the Mission, behind the Special Representative of the Secretary General and his Deputy, with primary responsibility for the day-to-day functioning of the Mission and the 27 UN agencies present in Afghanistan. My responsibilities included oversight and management of all security for over 800 direct- and affiliated-staff, all administrative and personnel actions for the staff, ensuring compliance with constantly-evolving UN guidance from headquarters in New York, fiduciary management of UN funds, and ensuring positive and constructive relationships with the sister/subordinate agencies represented in country. At one point, my team managed over a dozen properties in Afghanistan, plus two in Pakistan and two in Iran, as well as the computer systems, transportation, lodging and other requirements for staff in all these locations.

I oversaw the successful negotiation for the release of three of our staff members kidnapped by local criminals; presented and defended our budget for 2005 to UN Secretariat Staff in New York; and instituted and oversaw a “process modernization” project at the Mission that improved the quality and efficiency of everything from our travel approval process, invoice processing, and personnel accountability, to simply streamlining our Information Technology systems.

02/02 - 08/02
08/03 - 04/04

Director of International Support for the Emergency & Constitutional Loya Jirgas, sponsored by The Asia Foundation: Kabul, Afghanistan. I served as the focal point for international assistance and support to the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 and performed a similar role in support of the Constitutional Loya Jirga the following year (a “Loya Jirga” is, in Afghanistan, akin to a national “Constitutional Convention” in the US). Though employed by The Asia Foundation and funded by US Agency for International Development (USAID), this work in Afghanistan required

working closely with and for the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the government of Afghanistan (the Interim and then later the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan).

In the wake of the US intervention in Afghanistan, a peace agreement was signed in Bonn, Germany in December of 2001. I arrived at Kabul in February of 2002 to assist the Afghans in the planning and execution of their Loya Jirgas. In the course of the first few weeks on the ground, it became apparent that the Afghans had none of the institutional or fiduciary control measures required to receive tens of millions of dollars in international assistance, plan and execute a multi-week convention attended by several thousand thought-leaders from around the country that would be closely watched by the entire world: All in a country still wracked by political violence. Security was a significant concern.

Without usurping Afghan national pride and dignity, my task was to build the necessary structures able to plan and execute the two events. With a multi-national core team of 15, and an extended staff of about 120 people, we prepared for both the logistical challenges of the Jirga, as well as the substantive requirements. We had international soldiers working with Afghan Police to protect the site; German technicians installing audi-visual equipment purchased by the Brits; Norwegian (military) cooks instructing Afghan laborers on kitchen sanitation requirements; and Spanish bomb-disposal teams sweeping the university site daily.

Both Jirgas were moments of high-drama in Afghanistan, with significant threats and challenges but, in both cases, the events were ultimately successful. I subsequently was only the second non-Afghan to receive the Afghan Constitutional Medal from President Karzai for service, and was commended not only for completing an incredibly difficult and complex task, but for doing so while “leading from the midst.”

08/02 – 05/03

Senior Reconstruction Advisor, USAID Iraq Reconstruction Team: Baghdad, Iraq. As senior advisor, I led a team of subject-matter experts for major reconstruction projects, telecommunications, local governance, and civil military relations as they related to rebuilding the country. I was effectively the Chief of Staff for the Iraq reconstruction team at USAID. My responsibilities included conceptualizing missions and drafting terms of reference and statements of work for contracts that totalled nearly \$1 billion. I appeared on television several time representing the team and USAID with respect to reconstruction issues. I created training standards and programs for contract and USAID personnel who would eventually be deployed to Iraq. I represented the reconstruction team at Senior Staff briefings within USAID. At a certain point, I was requested by Ambassador Chamberlin (the Assistant Administrator for Asia-Near East at USAID) to re-direct my efforts to higher priorities in Afghanistan, in support of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and pending elections.

04/00 – 10/02

Adjunct Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA): Alexandria, Virginia. I engaged in research programs that included evaluations of complex contingency operations and the US government’s inter-agency responses to them; the role(s) of special operations forces in various post-conflict settings; the relationships between international civil and military actors in post-conflict and reconstruction settings; and mechanisms for identifying and supporting the appropriate institutions in post-conflict settings. I published and presented papers on these and related subjects.

04/97 – 03/00

Deputy Director of Political Affairs, Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH): Sarajevo, Bosnia-i-Herzegovina. This was my first senior diplomatic assignment and required me to support the Director as he worked with local and regional influencers to ensure that the fragile peace was sustained.

I had the portfolio for regional stability and integration (economic and political) and was the primary coordinating officer for the sub-principal engagements with other international agencies. I and my team of six created mechanisms for the civilian control of the military in BiH and worked with international military forces, Office of the High Representative, and various other international actors to assist the government of BiH in understanding and creating civilian controls of their military.

After 8 months as Deputy Director of Political Affairs, I was reassigned to be the “International Chairman of the Interim Executive Board Governing Srebrenica.” The Mayor and Municipal Assembly of Srebrenica were removed from their duties due to belligerent and counter-productive behaviour, and I effectively became the “Mayor of Srebrenica.” As such, I was ‘first among equals’ and led a multi-national, multi-disciplinary, multi-agency team dedicated to ensuring the safety, dignity, and eventual return of the residents of that devastated community. My work involved regular travel to the capitals of the Serb and Bosniak entities within the country, negotiations for simple things like the goods and services traditionally provided by government, as well brokering agreements between Serbs who currently lived in Srebrenica, and the Bosniaks (mostly widows and their families) who had been dispossessed during the war.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In my first assignment at the mission, I was responsible for the operations of the of the Mission (through a separation of duties, the Chief of Staff and Operations focused on staff-related issues and Deputy Chief of Staff focused on operational issues) I was the principle coordinating officer for security at the mission, and directly supervised five department heads (information technology, security, communications, transportation, and logistics) as we built the mission to over 2000 staff at our highest point.

Education:

June 2006	Norwich University, Master of Arts, International Diplomacy
December 1993	Georgia Institute of Technology, Graduate studies in Technology and Science Policy
June 1990	Georgia Institute of Technology, Bachelor of Science, Applied Physics

Military Service:

I ultimately served for a total of sixteen years on Active and Reserve Duty in the US Army Special Forces (the “Green Berets,”) before accepting an Honorable Discharge in order to accept a State Department assignment to Bosnia-i-Herzegovina.

Select (Unclassified) Publications:

“Aid During Conflict Interaction Between Military and Civilian Assistance Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001–June 2002.” Olga Oliker, Richard Kauzlarich, James Dobbins, Kurt W. Basseuner, Donald L. Sampler, John G. McGinn, Michael J. Dziedzic, Adam Grissom, Bruce Pirnie, Nora Bensahel, A. Istar Guven. Published by RAND National Defense Research Institute in 2004.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG212.sum.pdf

“Review of ‘The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight,’ by Robert Johnson.” Oxford University press, 2011. Reviewed by Larry Sampler in “Prism Magazine: 3, no.2;” published by the National Defense University, 2012. http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/prism3-2/prism164-167_sampler.pdf

“Report of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on Information Management for Net-Centric Operations.” Produced by the Defense Science Board for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Collectively authored by the members of the Summer Study, of which I was a member.

I have published various op-eds and blogs, and given many presentations and addresses. URLs for videos of some of my addresses are available at https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%22Larry+Sampler%22 and/or upon request.

References will be provided upon request.